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The North American power grid is one of the most complex technological networks, and its
interconnectivity allows both for long-distance power transmission and for the propagation of dis-
turbances. We model the power grid using its actual topology and plausible assumptions about
the load and overload of transmission substations. Our results indicate that the loss of a single
substation can lead to a 25% loss of transmission efficiency by triggering an overload cascade in the
network. We systematically study the damage inflicted by the loss of single nodes, and find three
universal behaviors, suggesting that 40% of the transmission substations lead to cascading failures
when disrupted. While the loss of a single node can inflict substantial damage, subsequent removals
have only incremental effects, in agreement with the topological resilience to less than 1% node loss.
PACS numbers:
As demonstrated in August of 2003, local disruptions
of power distribution within the North American power
grid can result in the loss of service to tens of millions of
customers. At the heart of this vulnerability is the fact
that the power grid has developed into one of the most
complex and interconnected systems of our time, and the
same capabilities that allow power to be transferred over
hundreds of miles also enable the propagation of local
failures into grid-wide events[1, 2]. To better understand
such events, the power grid needs to be studied from a
network perspective taking advantage of the recent ad-
vances in complex network theory[3].
Recently a great deal of attention has been devoted to
the analysis of error and attack resilience of both artifi-
cially generated topologies and real world networks. The
first approach that has been followed by researchers is
that of static failures[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] and consists in
removing a certain percentage of elements of the systems
and evaluating how much the performance of the network
is affected by the simulated failure. Following such an ap-
proach it has been shown that the removal of a sizable
group of nodes can have important consequences. Never-
theless, in most real transportation/communication net-
works, the breakdown of a single or of a very small size
group of elements can be sufficient to cause the entire
systems to collapse, due to the dynamics of redistribu-
tion of flows on the networks. To take into account this
phenomenon, dynamical approaches have been developed
[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Those are based on the fact that
the breakdown of a single component not only has direct
consequences on the performance of the network, but also
can cause an overload and consequently the partial or
total breakdown of other components, thus generating a
cascading effect.
Here, we use data on the network structure of the
North American power grid obtained from the POW-
ERmap mapping system developed by Platts, the energy
information and market services unit of the McGraw-
Hill Companies[21]. This mapping system contains in-
formation about every power plant, major substation,
and 115 − 765kV power line of the North American
power grid. Our reconstructed network contains N =
14, 099 substations andK = 19, 657 transmission (power)
lines. The substations can be divided into three different
groups: the generation substations set GG, whose NG =
1, 633 elements produce electric power to distribute, the
transmission substations set GT , whose NT = 10, 287 el-
ements transfer power along high voltage lines, and the
distribution substations, whose ND = 2, 179 elements
distribute power to small, local grids.As previously ob-
served, the North American power grid forms a connected
network, thus in principle power from any generator is
able to reach any distribution substation[10].
We model the power grid as a weighted[22, 23] graph
G, with N nodes (the substations) and K edges (the
transmission lines) and we represent it by the N × N
adjacency matrix {eij}. The element eij of such a matrix
is 0 if there is no direct line from the substation i to the
substation j; otherwise it is a number in the range (0, 1]
that represents the efficiency of the edge. Initially, for all
existing edges, eij is set equal to 1, meaning that all the
transmission lines are working perfectly.
Both in the static and in the dynamic approach, in
order to quantify how well networks operate before and
after the occurrence of breakdowns, a measure of per-
formance has to be used. Here, as in[9, 14, 15], we use
the average efficiency of the network[23] that, adapted to
the case of the North American power grid, is defined as
follows:
E =
1
NGND
∑
i∈GG
∑
j∈GD
ǫij (1)
where ǫij is the efficiency of the most efficient path
2between the generator i and the distribution substation j,
calculated as the harmonic composition of the efficiencies
of the component edges[24, 25, 26].
Once defined the efficiency as a measure of perfor-
mance, the natural definition of the damage D that a
failure causes is the normalized efficiency loss[27]:
D =
E(G0)− E(Gf )
E(G0)
, (2)
where E(G0) is the efficiency of the network before the
occurrence of any breakdown and E(Gf ) is the final ef-
ficiency that is reached by the system after the end of
the transient due to a breakdown, i.e. when the network
efficiency stabilizes.
In this paper we use the dynamical approach of the
CML model of Ref.[14], adapting it to our network. We
assume that each generator transfers power to all the dis-
tribution substations through the transmission lines. The
generators have also transmitting capabilities, so they are
both sources and intermediaries in power transmission.
This scenario could seem unrealistic in the early days
of electricity, when power was produced by local gener-
ators and transmitted only to the nearest distribution
substations[2]. Nowadays, however, power is often redi-
rected hundreds of kilometers away and our hypothesis
that power from each generator can reach each distribu-
tion substation is not far from reality.
Adapting previous work on complex networks[17, 18]
we define the load (also called betweenness) of each node
with transmitting capabilities as the number of most ef-
ficient paths from generators to distribution substations
that pass through the node. As in the CML model, we
associate to each node i a capacity Ci directly propor-
tional to the initial load Li it carries in the unperturbed
network [11]:
Ci = αLi(0) i = 1, 2..N (3)
where α > 1 is the tolerance parameter that represents
the ability of nodes to handle increased load thereby re-
sisting perturbations.
If, due to external causes, a breakdown occurs at one
or more nodes, so that they cannot work at all, the most
efficient paths will change and the power/load, since it
cannot be destroyed, will redistribute among the net-
work. Sometimes this leads to a situation in which a
certain number of nodes, forced to carry a load higher
than their capacity, cannot function regularly anymore
and show a degradation of their performance. Such a
degradation can modify the most efficient paths, redis-
tribute again the load on the network, and cause new
nodes to be overloaded. If the overload caused by the
initial breakdown is small, degradation will involve only
a tiny part of the system, while if the overload to be re-
absorbed is large enough, it will spread over the entire
system in an avalanche mechanism, hindering any inter-
action among nodes. The degradation of performance is
represented by the following dynamical model:
eij(t+ 1) =
{
eij(0)/
Li(t)
Ci
if Li(t) > Ci
eij(0) if Li(t) ≤ Ci
(4)
where j extends to all the first neighbors of i. In other
words, when a node i is congested, it is assumed that
the efficiency of power transportation from(to) i to(from)
its first neighbors decreases linearly with the overload
Li(t)/Ci.
A benefit of the CLM model is that it does not assume
that overloaded nodes fail irreversibly, but they have the
possibility of working again if, by power rerouting, their
load decreases below their capacity. In other words the
effects of overload on nodes are reversible. Moreover, no
explicit assumptions are made about the redistribution
of loads, but this redistribution emerges naturally from
the reorganization of efficient transmission paths follow-
ing a node failure. Simulating a network failure involves
removing a node from the network and monitoring the
progression of overloading nodes. If the tolerance param-
eter α is high enough the network does not present the
cascading effect typical of the redistribution of flows and
its efficiency remains unaffected by the failure. If the
tolerance parameter is very small, instead, the cascad-
ing effect takes place and the network rapidly collapses.
For intermediate values of α the network degrades more
slowly and its efficiency stabilizes to a value that is lower
than the initial one. We observed that the efficiency of
the network stabilizes into a steady state or small oscil-
lations around an efficiency value in about 10-20 steps.
(see inset of Figure 6).
The reason for the occurrence of oscillations is strongly
related to the reversibility of the effects of overload. Sup-
pose that two paths exist from generator i to the distri-
bution substation j (path A and path B) and that under
the condition of perfect functioning (i.e. before the oc-
currence of any breakdown) path A is more efficient than
path B. If at time t some nodes of path A become over-
loaded, it may happen that B becomes the most efficient
path from i to j. If this implies that most of the load
passing through A is redirected to B, the nodes of the
former path will recover efficiency to the detriment of
some nodes of the latter one. Therefore the situation in
which the most efficient path from i to j is A is restored
and the redistribution of flows starts again its cycle. This
switching between alternative paths causes the global ef-
ficiency to oscillate. Of course in a real world network
the behavior is more complicated because the described
cycle is concurrent with a redistribution of flows that in-
volves the whole network. However the oscillations are
evident all the same.
In our study, we have adopted two different types of
node overload progression schemes. The first is single
3node removal in which a single node is removed at time
zero and the network is progressed in time. This way,
we can model the effects of an external perturbation of
a single transmission node or generator. Nevertheless, it
could happen that several nodes fail at the same time or
in close succession or are shut down to save the equip-
ment. In fact, it often happens that blackouts occurs
because generators and transformers are hardwired to
protect themselves in response to a drastic change. To
model such type of cascading failure, we develop a second
node overload progression scheme involving many cycles
of node selection and removal and network progression.
In both the schemes, adopting the removal strategy
from[14], we have chosen nodes either randomly (ran-
dom removal) or selectively by highest load (load based
removal) and once removed, the efficiency of the network
and the load of the nodes were continually recalculated
in time. Only generation and transmission substations
were removed using the above strategy.
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FIG. 1: Global efficiency of the power grid after the re-
moval of random (triangles) or high-load (circles) generators
or transmission substations. The unperturbed efficiency is
E(G0) = 0.04133. As the overload tolerance α of the sub-
stations increases, the final efficiency approaches the unper-
turbed value. The random disruption curves were obtained
by averaging over 10 − 100 individual removals. The load-
based disruption curve is obtained by removing the highest
load generator and transmission node, respectively.
Our first results use the single-node progression scheme
for both removal types. Figure 1 shows a load based
(circle) removal and an average of at least 10 random
removals (triangle) for transmission and generation sub-
stations with final global efficiency as a function of the
tolerance of the network. These figures indicate that
above a critical tolerance value of approximately 1.42,
the removal of the highest loaded transmitter and gen-
erator substation has little effect on the overall network
efficiency. However at values of tolerance below the crit-
ical value, the global efficiency can be reduced by over
20 percent. For random removals, the critical value is
near 1.18 in both figures. These results clearly indicate
that the loss of nodes with high load causes a higher
damage in the system than the loss of random nodes.
Moving beyond averages, Figures 2 present scatterplots
of the efficiency of the network after the loss of randomly
selected nodes for 40 different tolerance values. Two dis-
tinct trends are suggested from the efficiency versus tol-
erance scatterplot. The first, a horizontal line of points
close to the unperturbed efficiency, indicates no efficiency
loss for any tolerance level. The second, corresponding
to tolerance-dependent damage, is a curve that initially
increases linearly, then saturates at high tolerance levels.
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FIG. 2: Scatterplot of final network efficiency for given tol-
erance values for the removal of randomly selected nodes. A
total of 1668 generator and 1558 transmission node removals
are presented on this figure.
The scatterplot cannot illustrate the multiplicity of the
observed (tolerance, efficiency) points. To gain insights
into the distribution of efficiency loss we determine the
cumulative damage distribution P (D), i.e. the probabil-
ity of observing damage larger than a given value D. Fig-
ure 3 shows the cumulative damage distribution for four
tolerance values: α = 1.025 (circles), α = 1.2 (squares),
α = 1.4 (diamonds) and α = 1.8 (triangles). As ex-
pected, the curves corresponding to distinct tolerance
values have markedly different ranges, indicating that
the higher the tolerance value the lower the probabil-
ity to cause high damage. The long horizontal region of
the α = 1.025 curve indicates a gap between high- and
low damage, corresponding to the separation into two
distinct damage behaviors observed in the scatterplot.
However, the other distributions are relatively continu-
ous, and all have power-law scaling regions with expo-
nents whose magnitude increases with tolerance, varying
between 0.5 and 2. The probability distribution of dis-
turbances on the power grid has been found to be a power
law with exponent close to −1.1[19, 20], corresponding to
4an almost flat cumulative distribution. This is in closest
agreement with our cumulative damage distribution for
low tolerances, suggesting that the overload tolerance of
the North American power grid is low.
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FIG. 3: Cumulative damage distribution for four different
tolerance values, α = 1.025 (circles), α = 1.2 (squares), α =
1.4 (diamonds), and α = 1.8 (triangles). The continuous line
indicates the cumulative distribution of disturbances on the
power grid, i.e. P (d > D) = Dδ−1, with δ ≃ 1.1[19, 20].
Comparing Figures 2 and 3 suggests the following ques-
tion: do the two distinct (tolerance-dependent and in-
dependent) behaviors correspond to different classes of
nodes? And if the answer is yes, what distinguishes the
nodes in the two domains? To answer these questions we
selected a sample of 15 nodes whose degrees and loads
cover the entire range of degrees and loads, and stud-
ied the effect of their (separate) removal for a range of
tolerance values. As Figure 4 shows, we find that some
nodes’ removal causes no decrease in network efficiency
for the entire range of tolerance values. Therefore, the
North American power grid is resilient to the loss of these
nodes.
Included within the set of selected nodes is the node
with the highest initial load. Interestingly, the removal
of that particular node does not have the greatest effect
upon the network. The node that has the greatest effect
initially and a substantial effect over the entire range of
tolerance values has roughly 80% the maximum load.
Based on Figure 4 we conclude that there are three
separable classes of nodes:
1. Nodes whose removal causes no or very little dam-
age for any tolerance. Around 60% of the nodes are
in this category.
2. Nodes whose removal causes a tolerance-dependent
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FIG. 4: Representative sample of node-dependent damage for
different tolerance values. Two main types of behavior can be
distinguished, one corresponding to no damage, and the other
to a universal damage-versus-tolerance curve. A third type
represents a discontinuous jump from tolerance-dependent to
no-damage behavior. The continuous curve corresponds to
Eq. 5.
damage following the universal curve
D = D0
(
1−
xβ
Kβ + xβ
)
(5)
where x = α− 1, D0 = 0.25 is the maximum dam-
age, K+1 ∼ 1.2 corresponds to the tolerance value
causing half-maximal damage, and the exponent
β ≃ 2.
3. Nodes that follow the tolerance-dependent curve for
a while then suddenly jump to the no damage be-
havior.
The range of damage available at a given tolerance
value is from zero (behavior 1) to the value given by
the formula for behavior 2, in good agreement with the
maximum damage indicated by Figure 3.
We find that the nodes causing no efficiency loss (be-
havior 1) have both low betweenness and low degrees
while the nodes that do affect the network upon re-
moval have higher betweenness/degree. Figure 5(a) re-
lates node degree and load with the damage caused by
the node’s removal for a set of 15 nodes. The plot in-
dicates that, although there is no direct correlation be-
tween degree, load and efficiency loss, nodes that have
both low degree and relatively low load will cause rela-
tively little damage when perturbed. Figure 5(b) shows
the load histogram of generators and transmission sub-
stations whose removal at tolerance α = 1.025 leads to
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FIG. 5: (a) Correlation between node degree, load, and the ef-
ficiency loss its removal causes for 15 randomly selected nodes.
The overload tolerance is α = 1.2. The nodes causing no
damage (filled circles) have low loads and degrees.(b) Load
histogram for the generators (white bars) and transmission
substations (dashed bars) whose removal does not cause any
damage at α = 1.025. A total of 639 generators and 476
transmission substations were included in this plot.
no efficiency loss. Each bin corresponds to a load range
of 1000. We find that 90% of no-damage-causing genera-
tors have loads< 1000 and degree< 3, while 90% of non-
damage-causing transmission nodes have load< 2000 and
degree=2. The fraction of generators with degree 1, ex-
pected to cause insignificant efficiency loss, is 72%. Thus
the network’s resilience is higher than trivially expected.
Moving to the cascading failure, figure 6 shows a trans-
mitter substation load based failure at a tolerance of
α = 1.025. Here we remove the highest-load node, wait
for the system to stabilize, then find and remove the
current highest-load node, repeating this iteration sev-
eral times. Interestingly, the final global efficiency after
nearly thirty nodes removed is within ten percent of the
final global efficiency for a single-node removal of same
type and tolerance. The first node removed does the most
damage while each successive removal does little to the
worsening of efficiency. Similar behavior is recorded for
generators. In random removals most behaviors, due to
the higher probability of selecting a low degree and low
betweenness node, reach stability, where the efficiency re-
mains roughly constant, fter the first removal as in figure
6.
This results is complementary and similar in spirit to
the results of static transmission node removals[10] where
the removal of up to 1% of the nodes had little effect on
the connectivity of the power grid. As reference [10] has
found, in this regime the connectivity of the grid, in other
words the reachability between generators and distribu-
tion substations, decreases approximately proportionally
with the fraction of nodes removed. Here we obtain effi-
ciency loss (damage) of 40% after the removal of 0.33% of
the high-load transmission nodes. Both of these results
suggest that perturbations higher than 1% are needed for
catastrophic failure.
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FIG. 6: Cascading failure with 30 consecutive node removals.
A new node was removed at multiples of 50 iterations, the
selection was either based on the highest load (left) or random
(right). Inset: typical evolution of network efficiency after the
removal of a single node.
These results are simultaneously reassuring and omi-
nous. The North American power grid has been proven
both theoretically and empirically to be highly robust to
random failures. However, this research highlights the
possible damage done to the network by a more targeted
attack upon the few transmission substations with high
betweenness and high degree. Our results, taken together
with the observed disturbance distribution, suggest that
even the loss of a single high-load and high-degree trans-
mission substation reduces the efficiency of the power
grid by 25%. This vulnerability at the transmission level
deserves serious consideration by government and busi-
ness officials so that cost effective counter measures can
be developed. Two possibilities include reducing the load
upon the highly loaded nodes by building more transmis-
sion substations and controlling the spread of the cascade
[28, 29], or by producing power on a more local level via
environmentally friendly methods.
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